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9

9, 17

ST~TENENT

OF THE CASE

The facts of the case are basically set forth in the
11ndJngs of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the court
(R-lc,1 throuc_rh R-l':i4).

R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc.,

dcc[cndant and appellant, and hereinafter callecJ "Tolman" was
awarclcd a contract for construction of roads and other facilities
for lhl' United States Forest Service near Fishlake.

Tolman

subsequently, by a written subcontract agreement subcontracted
(R-49 through 52, R-84 through 87) eleven specific bid iter.1s
of work to Prince Construction Company, plaintiff and respondent,

'
c:md hereinafter
called "Prince."

Prince performed part of the

subcontract items but by late summer or early fall of 1973
Prince had not performed three of the contract items.

Tolman

Look over these contract items and completed the work.

It was

not until sometime later after the contract work had been
completed that the parties became aware of a problem with payment
under the contract ancJ a dispute arose.
First,

There are several matters which are not distJuted.
there is no dispute t11at the subcontract agreement is the
c1ocur:1cnt governing the relationship between the parties.
Seccrndly,

the court found that Tolman gave actual notice of

taking over the work from Prince.
that Tolman, in fact,

There is also no question

took over the work and it was Tolman who

completed each of the three remaining contract items.

The court

was called on to determine the proper measure and method of
:orupensation to both parties.

The court applied the doctrine of

1.
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quantum merui t in arriving at th c amount;; to be'
party.

ilWC\

rJcJ c etch

TEe detail of the courts award ol compensation will

be detailed hereinafter.

Bas_i_call~',

the ccrnrt delerioined

the value of the three subcontract items since those ilre the
ones in dispute and subtracted from the subcontract net value
the cost of Tolman's work to complete the work along with some
offsets and awarded the remaining balance of $18,386.34 to
Prince

(R-156).
It is from the procedure used by the court in applying

the ·:l(',:''-rine of quantum meruit to the fact situation that
The facts show that Tolman had an unbalanced
bid for the three contract items in question in that Tolman
had misunderstood the contract and entered a bid in excess of
its costs to do the work.

Appellant contends that the three

contract items generated the excess fund for the amount of the
judgment so that when the court applied its version of quantum
meruit the court simply credited Tolman for the cost of the work
done to complete the subcontract agreement and gave the remainim
value of $18,386.24 to Prince by way of Judgment.

Tolman

contends that the excess amount of $18,386.34 in the three
contract items should have been awarded by the court to Tolman
instead of to Prince.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter came before the court for trial in two parts.
The first trial before the court was on the issue of liability.
The issue of damage Wils heard Liy the cou1t some months later.
The court entered its Findings

of

Fact cinJ Conclusions of Law
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2.

Uuve111!Jer JO, l'J78.

The court awarded Prince the sum of

$18, l8G.34.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY TIIIS APPEAL
Toln~n

asks this court to either reverse the judgment

of the District Court and award the $18,386.34 to Tolman or
to rcnand the case back to the District Court with instructions
that the court is to correctly apply quantum meruit such that
the z111ard of $18, 386. 34 be made to Tolman who performed the
work on the three remaining contract items and not to Prince
who did not do the work on the three remaining contract items.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prince and Tolman entered into a subcontract agreement
dated October 7, 1972 relating to certain road building and
related construction work connected with a contract Tolman
received from the Forest Service titled United States Forest
Service Fish Lake Sanitation Project.

(Rl51).

Prince started

work in the fall of 1972 on the $73, 521. 48 subcontract which
l1ad 'JO calendar days for completion on eleven separate bid items.
(R49 through 52, R84 through 87)

(Exhibit A).

Prince worked

for eleven days during 1972 (tr page 14 line 5) and returned to
the project in July of 1973 (tr page 15 line 19).

Prince

testified that there were three contract items he could not do
in July of 1973 to wit:
25 line 2224).
of worl:.
t'"
1

clone,
!\,

,-,_1

d,1

t

1

11·,

2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2

(tr page

Prince continued to work on the other 7 items

The final i tern was for crushecl aggregate and could not
until ite::is 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2 the hauling and
lJorr

1

JVJ

\Vas

done.

Prince did not have the equipment to

three i terns and was arranCJing with a 11r. Wirthlin to do
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the remainin<J work.

(tr p.

28-30).

\Vlwn tile_· tirc1e hacJ LJO!le

past the 90 days set forth in the contract sorncLime in
October, Tolman told Prince he woulcJ do tlle !Jorrow, tne
overhaul and the second overlE1ul on items 2222-1,
(tr 25 line 26 etc.)

and 2230-2.

Tolman tllereilfter did all

of the 11ork on the items listed above
38 line 11)

(tr 39 line 27 etc.)

2230-1

(tr 37 line 29 to i-'aLJe

(tr 40 line 1-6 etc.).

Thereafter, Prince was paid for the work he completed on seven
of the items but was not paid on the three items listed of
2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2 because Tolman did that work along
with

Prince was paid $48,160.19 by Tolman

_s:._,1

(tr page 4L line 18-22).

A dispute arose between the parties

as to how such Prince should be paid and a settlement of
ences attempted (tr p. 43).

diffe~

Subsequent to the disµute arising

Prince testified that he expected the total subcontract price
for the overhaul and borrow items even though he didn't

physic~

do the work and he was asking for the full bid price based on
the contract.

(tr 45 line 16-28).

When Prince was asked about

the provisions in the contract that any assignments of portions
the work had to be approved by Tolman, Prince said that he
knew that and Wirthlin knew it and the change was never
or permission to subcontract to anyone else given

reques~

(tr 82 etc.).

It was also clear that without subcontractin0 the work to somern
else, Prince had no capability to complete items 2222-1,
and 2230-2.

(tr 82 etc.).

2230-1

The most Prince had was a "verbal

agreement" subsequently denied by Tolman that he had "subcontrac
the three i terns back to Tolman.

(tr p.

'H) .

'I' lie

tes tirc1ony was

clear that Prince never told ·1·/irthlin to come and do tne work
on the three items

(tr 102 line 27-30

[>.

103

line 1-12).
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Tolrnan tl1en testified that he did items 2222-1, the
1uad barrow;

2230-J, the roadway haub and 2230-2, the roadway

IL-iul·, zrncl contractec1 to a third party item 2240-1, the crushed
:t']']recpte

(tr 134,135,).

Tolman told Prince in "the latter

l'·1rt of September th:1t he 1wuld have to step in and do these
things," meaning the 3 above listed i terns
page 137 line 1 to 5)

1;riting.

(tr 136 line 18-30,

but gave the notice verbally and not in

At the time the verbal notice was given, Prince

continued doing other things and Tolman completed the three
i terns.

.

(tr 142 - etc.)

Tolman stated his reason for pressing

Prince to complete the work and ultimately to take over the
work was pressure from the Forest Service Engineer.
1 inc

2G)

Tolman testified the work for 2222-1, 2230-1 and

2230-2 was scheduled to be done by June of 1973.
line 4 -

(tr 142-

line 23)

(tr 1G2 line 24-30

(tr 162

so that the asphalt could be in place in 1973.
Tolman testified that there was some

urgency to put the asphalt on because of the fuel shortage and
scarcity of petroleum products

(tr 1G3 line 1-16).

The engineer

informed him he as lagging and he went to Prince to see if the
work could be hurried along (tr 164).
work on the three items

(tr 165).

Prince to do Prince's haul work
~ook

four weeks

in 1973

Thereafter Prince did no

Tolman had no agreement with

(tr 168 line 18-23).

The work

(tr 169 line 9) and the asphalt was not placed

(tr 169 line 16-24).

So that the work scheduled for

1973 went through the winter to be completed in 1974.

Prince

•.vas invited to return to the job in 1974 to complete his items
;,1,1- '1111 not retun1

(tr 169,170) ..

The court stated after the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony that "with regard to plaintiff':c; clciir,1,

that he

entered into a subcontract with Mr. Tolrncin to haul what has
been referred to as borrow,

the court would fi11Ll that claim

is not supported by the evidence.

Mr. Prince,

the court

understctnds your testimony was that you were enterinCj into a
subcontract for Mr. Tolr:ian to haul this mciterial. .. but the
court cannot find that to be a contract, because your evidence
does not support the requirements of a contract, which would
be a meeting of the minds or evidence that Mr. Tolman also
understood that to be the contract.
to

~~c~.

When an attempt is made

the terms of a written contract by an oral contract,

there is a substantial burden placed upon the party makiny the
claim of an oral contract.

This court cannot find that the

parties made that agreement.

The court would find that Mr.

Tolman did in fact take over the hauling and will find that
he gave no written notice as provided by the contract.

This

leaves Mr. Tolman somewhat vulnerable as to his position ...
\tr 189 line 18-30, 190 line 1-7).
The court went on in TR 190 to find there was evidence to
support an agreement for Tolman to do the hauling and that no
time restrictions were violated such that there would l.Je a
breach of contract.

(tr 191).

The court found no evidence of manipulation on the part
of Mr. Tolman to get out of a part of the contract where he saw
a loss and hold onto the part where he wds a gain (TR 192 line
2-6).

The court very importantly found the contract to l.Je

divisible (TR 192 line 7-8).

The court found that "the form

6.
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i tcn1s were taken over
~ayment

l~y

Mr. Tolman and he is entitled to

for taking over these items.

And, at this point, the

court is inclined to feel that it should be on the basis of
quantum mcruit

(TP 192-11-14).

The court also found that

Prince had actual notice from Tolman that the work would be
taken over.

(Tr 192 line 26-30).

With the evidence as to liability before the court and
the court committed to the concept of quantum meruit, the trial
uroceeded to the second phase of damages wherein the court
found that Tolman had received payments of the three items as
follows:
$13, 630. 00

a.

Item No. 2222-1 Barrow Road

b.

Item No.

2230-1 Overhaul Road

20,454.00

c.

Item No.

2230-2 Overhaul Road

17,965.00

Total Paid

$52,049.00

Less adjustr.ients for additional
work over and above the contract
15,269.00

amount
Net Payment on three items

$39,586.00

The court then allowed offsets for the
cost of work done on the three items by
15,269.67

Tolman of
Sub Balance

$24,316.33

and the court allowed other adjustments
5,929.99

and offsets of:
Final Dalance
Tfh

nH,386.34

SUJ, 386. 34 which represents payment of the subcontract

to ·1·011,un by thc Forest Service less the cost of Tolman' s
11

ork Sponsored
and other
offsets left a balance which the court awarded
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the three items which generated tile 1:unJ ''i monc~· tJ]c: jud,Jment
ultimately was taken from.
ARCurn:tJT

POINT I
Tl!E COURT ERRED IN THE \'11W IT APPLIED THE
QUANTliM MERUIT TO THE FACT SITU11'1'IO'..J.

DOC1'!UiH.: OF

The subcontract sets forth the basic quantum meruit
doctrine in paragraph 2.

It is important that the court follow

the subcontract provisions or the well estalilislled rules which
surround the concept of quantum meruit.
p, ,.,\graph 2 of the subcontract agreement desiyna teu as
"Frc_,,;
Work,

-, .. cc:n .J£' Work, Delays, Commencement and Completion of
c~c."

clearly sets for the circumstances whereby the

contractor may take back the work and what the compensation to
the contractor will be as follows:
"any costs incurred by the contractor in doing
any portion of the work ... shall be charged against
any monies due under the terms of this agreement, and
in the event the total amount due or to become due
under the terms of this agreement shall be insufficient
to cover the costs accrued by the contractor in completing
the work, then the subcontractor ... shall be ... liable
unto the contractor for the; difference."
Appellant submits that the contract provision is nothing
more than a restatement of the gc;neral principles of contract
law in such a situation.

Appellant also sulimits that tne court

folloHed the provisions of paragi:apl1 2 in that it qave Tolman
credit for the actual cost of the work done.

But, appellant

submits most strongly that the court failed to correctly apply
the doctrine of quantum merui t

tu the: [1ottion of the subcontract

agreement which represented the excesc; arfJU!lt of money after
Tolman was paid for the 1mrJ; lie , Ii

r].

'l'hc

c'xcos~:;

.:1mount \Vas
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i:l.

l_,r~cous 1_:

tl1cin

uf an error in bir1c1ing which gave Tolman more money

it c0st to do the work.

The court was correct in giving

'I'r:ilmon credit for the actual work he did, but erred when it
~\;cirdcd

\·1hat amounts to a valance of the subcontract price

un the three items to Prince.
of the Law of Contracts, Section 246: Corbin

:~'-'statement

on Contracts, Section 1089 says with emphasis added, states:
"When a contractor [Prince in this case) fails
to perform a construction contract, the owner [Tolman
in this case) is entitled to complete the work or
have it completed by a third party.
The contractor
[Prince] is then liable for the costs incurred in
such completion decreased by the amount of the contract
price for the work which the owner [Tolman) then does
n.ot have to pay the contractor.

Implicit in both the restatement and the subcontract
provision is the concept that if the contract costs more to
complete than was bid,
difference.

the subcontractor must pay for the

However, our situation is unusual because the

subcontract, after paying Tolman for the work done, still has
$l(J,386.34 which is in excess of the work Tolman did, plus
otli·=:r adjustments.

Counsel submits that the law is that when

the v;orl: is taken back and actually done by the contractor
that the one who does the work is entitled to what value is
rcm0ininq in the subcontract.
Tl1ere is no question that Prince did any of the work so
Ll1c' calc11la tions under the subcontract provision and the
rcc:i:atcrC1ent are very simple to calculate.

There is simply no

crl'clit <Jiven to Prince for the work since he didn't do any. All

,r

i

he cost c;hould go to 'l'olman.
,. ·'" ·i•t

I_,

I

L11:it

ch

That is what happened in this

tie court did not address itself to the remaining
left in the subcontract.

The court erred

~.i 1·.'hi
ls Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
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9.

in awarding the balance of the subcontract which did nut
represent work done to Prince.

The court should huvc awarded th:

$18,386.34 which represents r<.0maininCJ money in the subcontract
because of an unbalanced bid to Tolman.
In Judye Swan's order entL'red at Pl2),

the court says,

"The court outlines the Findings of Fact and further finds
that the four items were taken over by Mr. Tolman and he is
entitled to payment for taking over those items.

i\t this

point the court is inclined to feel that it should be on a
quantur.i meruit basis."
mcrcit,

Appellant agrees that by applying quantu:

the court is correctly following the intent of the

Restatement of Law and the subcontract provision of the
subcontract agreement.
fact,

Appellant agrees that the court did,

in

apply quantum meruit to the point of crediting Tolman

for the work he did.

However, appellant disagrees with the court

in awarding the balance remaining in the subcontract to Prince
because that conclusion does not follow if the court had
properl~

applied the doctrine of quantum meruit.

Had the court

applied quantum meruit as it indicated in the transcript and the
rules the court would have awarded the remainder of the money
in the subcontract agreement to To1man.
The following agreement is inssupport of the concept that
the Judge should have awarded the remaining monies in the
contract to Tolman.

Language from the Oklahoma Suprc=me Court

summarizes this situation very well:
"It is an elementary princi plc of the law of concepts
that in order to recover upon 0 contract, the contractor ...
must first establish his own performance or u valid excuse
for his failure to i)erfon.l.
Since• plzu11tiff failed ...
to complete tlw work hc cuntraclcd to do, without vaUd
excuse for such failure, he wa~; ent.itled to no JUclgment
against defendant. "!ii_l_~cr· v._ -~'2_u_1_1_'J, l'J i Okl. SO_;,
l 72 byp.
994.
995 Funding
( )for. digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored
the 2d
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'l'i1

it lci1tC)ua0e \·1a:; quoted with approval as the law in this State

111

LOW-'::'.__

v.

Rosenl~f,

12 Utah 2d 190, 364 p.2d 418

(1961).

"1\ pa1-Ly gerierully cannot rec ver without showing
full performance ot his part [of the contract].
~ny right of recovery as a result of part performance
is on il quuntum meruit.
['J'here may be recovery] where
only part )Jerformance has been rendered if such partial
performance was accepted by, or was of benefit to the
other part:; "Ardoin v. Royden" S.W. 2d
(Tex. Civ.
1.pp. 1959); Lowe v. Rosenlof, Supra.

Prince cannot show performance for anv of the $18,386.34.
Ti:·~·

iL.
£01_-

court has ruled that Tolman took over the work and completed
Under the doctrine of quantum meruit there is no justification
Pril!ce to receive any more for the work he did than what he

rE'cciyed.

He did none of the work, therefore, he should have

riceived no money for that work done by Tolman.
Certainly there is no prejudice to Prince if he receives
quantum meruit for what he did.
was paid for what he did.

There is no question that Prince

He received over $48,000 for work done.

The question is who gets the remaining $18,386.34 in the contract.
Prince was paid for what he did and Tolman was paid for what he
did and because of the unbalanced nature of the bid, there is s
still $18,386.34 remaining.

By rules of quantum meruit, appellant

s 1,bmi ts the court erred because Prince did nothing by way of
perfori:1i1nce to warrant any award to him of any more than what
Jw di c1 _

Dy requiring Tolman to show what work was

required to

c.ir.1plelc the contract and reducing the amount in the subcontract
b; that amount is simply the reverse of having Prince show what
he did and reducing it for the subcontract amount the amount of
18,38G.34 v10uld remain.

11.
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It should be remembered tllut quu11luin rnci u1 t wllich
doctrine of the court applied,

1.S

the

io; not a cont r<1·_·Luill cluctrirw

but an equitable doctrine desi')ned to equi tiibl '/ dnc! iui rly
achieve a balanced result in o c3se.

ll\

011 ;

applying the doctrine of quantunr meriut,

tlic court has 0chievecl

a result that is unfair and unjust to Tol mun v1hu did lhe work
and unjustly enriching to Prince who under the jucigme11t, will
be paid for what he did but did not do.
The quantum meruit basis of recovery is equitable in natun
and is not predicated on the contruct.
r such circumstances, where benefits have
to the owner by reason of material
furn;.shed or labor performed by the contractor,
eq.:it:.· 1·1ill sometimes require the owner to account
for the reasonable value of the benefits received,
not because the contractor who has breuched his
contract has any right to rely thereon, but because
it would be inequitable for the owner to receive
and retain something for nothing at the expense of the
contractor.
United States Pipe & Foundary Co. v.
City of Waco,
100 S.W. 2d 1099 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
cic·~c·ucJ

Thus, plaintiff must show it would be ineyui table for Tolma
to retain the benefits, if any,

from the four items in question

before plaintiff can recover on quantum meruit.

Some courts have

said that plaintiff must show unjust enrichment of defendant
before a quantum meruit recovery will be allowed. Nelson v.
Hazel,

433 p.2d 120

(IC:. 196-/).

Prince contends that he should be paid ut the contract
price for the four items in question.
the rules of law discussed above,
proper.

Tolmon submits thut under

such payr~nt would nut be

Prince did not earn payrnent at the contract µrice by

full performance of the items nr,r di cl he

l

c:t iiJlish

<l

valid excuse
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for his failure to perform.

His muximum recovery on those

ilcms is thus limited to quantum meruit.

Since Prince did

nothing on the contract items pluintiff would not be paid
tor those items.
Tolmun submlts that the case should be remanded back t6 the
c·ourt to apply the doctrine of quantum meruit fairly for both
purties.

The court only partially applied the doctrine relying

on a mixture of adherence to the contract yet applying an
equitsale doctrine of quantum meruit.
Except for the extra $18,386.34 which neither party did
any work tp receive, the court applied the doctrine of quantum
meruit.

However, it is unjust and unfair to award the

$18,3BG.34 to Prince simply because the money was the remainder

after Tolman was paid for his work.
POINT II
THE COURT IN ITS CALCULATIONS ,'\PPLIED QUAN'l'UM MERUIT
TO CREDIT TOLMAN FOR WORK ACTUALLY DONE BUT FAILED
TO APPLY QUMJ'rU/.1 MERUIT TO THE REMAINING BALANCE OF
$18,386.34.

If the findings of fact are not disputed so that there
ure notquestions of fact remaining, it is obvious that the
court's logic in applying quantum merui t is exactly reversed from
what should have been.

The court had Tolman calculate the

vuluc of what he did on the subcontract, but did not require
PLince to do the same thing.

Had the court_required Prince to

calculate what he did on the project, the court could have then
easily calculated which party receives what part of the contract.
Tf the court paid Tolman for what he did and if the court paid
1

L;

i

~·

11

1 t

f."
in

11!1,

t:J1L'

..__·,

L lie ilicl the court would still have roughly $18, 000
111

t r,-1ct
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to distribute.
of quo.ntum merui t since Prince did not con1p I c>tt_' th1c work nor
perform on the items of work th<"n ~he courL \;uuld have LJ.warded ti
$18,000 to Tolman because he is the ori<Jlllctl
\~hen

c 1 l11tracLor.

Prince did not do the work the subcontr:ict wac: t<lkc>n over

by Tolman and Prince was paid for whLJ.t he did.
It is interesting to note how consistent the numbers would
be if the court had reversed the situation so that the proof of
the numbers would be on Prince.
$87,000 with no adjustments.

The contract price roughly

Prince was paid roughly $48,000

= $39,000)

($87,000 less $48,000

Then yo--' reduce theamount Tolman got credit for of roughly
$15,000 for the work done on the three contract items.
($39,000 less $14,000

=

$24,000)

Then reduce again by the

roughly $6,000 Tolman got credit for in the offsets for work
the next year in 1974, etc.

($24,000 less $6,00U

=

$1~,000)

The $18,000 roughly corresponds to the Jud0ment amount of
$18,386.34 which the court awarded to Prince bacause it was what
was left in the subcontract agreement.
What this shows is that either way the court applies
quantum meruit to pay both the parties their share of work
actually Cduses around $18,000 to remain in the subcontract
agreement.

Appellant submits that it is clear that the $18,000

is simply an excess amount after deducting for work actually
done by both parties and the balance of $18,000 would rouyhly
remain in the subcontract agreement using either approach.

14.
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TlFJS

the real questi,-=m is once of which party should get

the excess $18,000.
POINT III
Tl!E COURT IlJ I'IllDING THE CONTRACT DIVISIBLE SHOULD
Hl\VI: AWARDED TllE EXCESS AMOUNT OF THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT
LESS APPROPRIATE PAYMENTS TO THOSE WHO DID THE WORK TO TOLMAN
\'ii10 ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE WORK OF THE THREE CONTRACT ITEMS
l/ll!ICH l\CTUALLY CREATED THE EXCESS AMOUNT.
The court found that the "items of the subcontract
agreement were divisible."

This is important because of the

area in which the $18,38G.34 judgment comes from.

The court

found that Tolman took over the work on three specific items
and was paid by the Forest Service with adjustments for additional work the sum of $39,000.00 as follows:
$13.630.00

a.

Item No. 2222-1 Borrow Road

b.

Item No.

2230-1 Overhaul Road

20,454.00

c.

I tern No. 2230-2 Overhaul Road

17,965.00

Total Paid
Less adjustments for additional
work
Net Paid

$52,049.00
15,269.00
$39,586.00

The court then allowed ottsets for the cost of work
clone and some other adjustments as follows:
Net paid on three itccms
Less cost of work done by Tolman

$39,586.00
15,269.67
$24,316.33

Less Offsets

5,929.99
Total Judgment

$18,386.34
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15.

The judgment is basically the amol1'1t of 1,1ont?y lc:ft in
the contract after both parties ho.ve been pciicl for the work
that they did.

The court is then left with o. j ucJc;1llcnt for

$18, 386.34 which simply is the excess of the contract price
over the cost of the work.
It is important that the contract is divisible beco.use
the basic fund of money that caused the surplus in the first
place arises from the three items of work which Tolman took
over and performed.
contract lL

If quantum meruit is applied or if the

'i.c;i.on number 2 is applied,

the surplus amount

of $18,386.34 should go to Tolman.
It could be argued that the subcontract which is the
subject of this action called for Prince, the subcontractor, to:
eleven items of the work required by the prime contract between
defendant, the prime contractor, and the forest service.

The

amount of compensation which Prince was to recei vc for each of
those items was separately stated in the subcontract.
that compensation was so stated item by item,

Because

the contract betweE

the parties was, as the Court found, divisible in no.ture.
This divisible contract is, in effect,

several separate

contracts between the parties which may be independently completi
and paid for.

Prince is entitled to payment o.t the contract

price for the items of the divisible contrctct which he completed
and any breach or dispute concerning the other items does not
affect that right to payment.

On all items on whicll there is a

dispute or breach of the contract, however,

the norf'.1al rules of

contract law apply to measure the dama(_JCS for the' Lreach and to
deterraine which party is rC'spon'oiJ,1 e for

L] 1o:;c

cL:1ma~1es.
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lG.

The court found that defendant, Tolman, took over the
three items stated above of the items in the contract because
Prince had not performed on those items.

The court also found

thut Prince had actual notice that Tolman was going to take over
those items as Tolman was allowed to do by paragraph 2 of the
contruct.

Prince made no protest or objection to the take over

by Tolman of those items.

Because the contract is divisible, Prince is entitled to
recover the contract price on the items which he completed.
The maximum which he can recover on the other items is to be
determined on the basis of quantum meruit.

.

which fits the situation in this case.

That is the rule

Each of the separate

items is treated, in effect, as an entire contract an on each
of the items:
Since the amount saved by Tolman by not having to pay
Prince to

co~plete

them, Tolman is not entitled to recover

any damages from Prince on those items.
On the other hand, since Prince did not complete the
items in question, he is not entitled to recover the contract
price from Tolman.

Restatement, Section 246(b).

Prince may argue that Tolman is not entitled to proceed
as under paragraph 2 because the five days written notice
referred to in that paragraph was not provided.

The court found,

however, that Prince had actual notice of Tolman's intent to
take over the four items.

Prince would have been no better off

us far as remedying the breach of the contract is concerned had
the written notice been given.

Because of the actual notice,

Prince was in no way damaged by the lack of the written notice.
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17.

It is quite cle.:ir that the langu.:ir1e cjllOtccl

LlUOVC

f1·om

paragraph 2 of the contract uctween the J'd' ttcs dews not ollow
Prince to recover the contro.ct price for the items wliicli were
done by Tolman.

That laIHJuacic provides tiw t

Prince is liaule

for the costs incurred by Tolman in comµlcti11y tile four items
and that Tolman could charge those co.3ts aciainst monies "due or
to become due" to Prince under the contract.
Tolman could,

In other words,

if necessary, charge the costs of comµletion aga1.

mci-. ._ ,. "-::;_ch were to be paid to Prince for his cornµletion of th
ot:1e~·

_;_t~ms

covered by the subcontract agreement.

the contract, nor any principle of contract law,

Howhere does
provide that

Prince is to be paid for the items completed by Tolman.

The

payments for the four items done by Tolman never became due to
Prince because Prince did not do the work and earn the payment.
The divisible nature of the contract µlaces

the emµhasis

of what work was done in proper perspective uecause each item
can be calculated as a single entity whicl1 the court did not

&

Had it looked to those areas where the surJlus money existed tt
create the judgment it would have realized that i t was in the
items of work done by Tolman and would have correctly aµplied
the laws of quantum meruit.
The court did find that frince relied on a conversation
between Prince and Tolman wherein Prince felt that Tolman wou~
do the hauling.

The subcontract agreement does not provide for

such changes and without a writing as required there can be no
actual agreement but the court found no breach of contract on
either plaintiff or defen1ic1nt' ,;

1'·11 1-

Tlw nel iCincc on the

conversation apparently kept Prjnce t1un1 brcc1ching tile contrac:
but does not set up an actual chan<Je in

U1r_•

sul.Jcontract ayreemi
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which the court fournJ defendant took over pursuant to
Defendant did not protest the

paragraph 2 with actual notice.
take over.

It is important to note that Prince under provisions

of the subcontract agreement cannot assign or subcontract any
part of his subcontract without approval of the defendant.

No

part of the subcontract agreement was ever assigned or subcontracted as there is no document or evidence to show that it was.
Defendant submits that the evidence clearly shows that
Defendant did the hauling work covered in the three contract
items.

Secondly, the evidence is clear that plaintiff did not

do the hauling work and would be unjustly enriched if it were
paid for something it did not do.

Thirdly, the court found

that defendant gave actual notice and the items were taken
back by the defendant.

Fourth, the court found that there was

no subcontract agreement between Prince and Tolman but did find
that Prince relied on a conversation he had with Tolman which
Tolman does not remember which keeps Prince from breaching
his contract.

The law is clear as to how the damages in such

a situation are to be handled which law is merely a restatement
of the subcontract agreement which gives Tolman the payment for
the contract and if the expense of the work exceeds the amount
of the contract price, Prince would be responsible for the excess
of expense over contract price.

In this case the expense of

the work did not exceed the contract price and both the law and
the subcontract agreement would pay the contract price to the
one who clid the work, namely, the defendant, Tolman.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19.

SUMili\HY

The evidence is not in qucsLion.

lt

LS

clear tli.:it no

matter how one views the evidence the s.:ime bao;i c Licts appear
as follows:
l.

Tolman had a contract with the F,Jrcst Service• which

he subcontracted to Prince.
2.

Prince did part of the subcontract, but Tolman yave

actual notice to Prince that Tolman would complete the contract,
3.

•.-;ha::. ,

It is not relevant to the Doctrine of qu.:intum w::ruit

·,·~c_.,,,:::e:::

\Jere had or what agreements were made.

It is

simply iraportant who does the work and who performs the effort,
,l.

Both the contract document and the Restatement are

quantum meruit doctrines and the court attempted to apply
quantum meruit.

5.

The contract is divisible in nature and because i t

is divesible in nature the court should have looked to what
factors created the fund for the judgment award.

In this case

the court obviously added up the three contract i terns to deterrni·
the available monies and then subtracted out appropriate
adjustments.
G.

If the court had correctly applied quantum meruit and

given proper recognition to where the money of the j udyment carne
from the court would have recognized that it basically came fror.
three items of work which were done by Tolman and were not done
by Prince.
7·

Prince is not prejudiced in any way not to receive

the $18, 38G. 34 because lie did nut Ju llic vmrk in the three
contract items which created tllc

1110 1v:y

frcH, 1

ivliicil the JUdqment

came.
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U.

Tolmcin is prejudiced bec.:iuse he tqok over the three

i tem!c; of work which were all that needed to be completed and
sor,11, L~ted those three i terns and it was from those three i terns
that the

mone~'

for the judgment comes from and yet he gets

nonL of the money even though he did the work.
9.

It is clear that the $18,386.34 is an excess of

subcontract price less the payments to the parties who did the
work.

If Tolmcin is paid what work he did and if Prince is

paid what work he did there is still $13,386.00 or so left
to be awarded by the court.
Appellant submits that because Tolman did
the work the $18,386.34 should be awarded to Tolman.

If the

doctrine of quantum meruit had been followed by the court, the
court would have awarded the $18,386.34 to the party who actually
performed the work which party would have been Tolman.
Appellant prays that the court reverse the
judgment of the District Court and award the $10,386.34 to Tolman
::ir rc1,1and the c.:ise back to the District Court with instructions
pursucint to the doctrine of quantum meruit to award the

$18,386.3~

to Tolmun.
nespectfully submitted this

?CU.

day of July, 1979.

~~or
Appellant, R. C. Tolman
Construction Company, Inc.
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